Saturday, June 8, 2013

Why Big Data Marketing Needs To Get A Whole Lot Bigger



Big data giving insight into consumer behavior. Aivars Lode Avantce

Why Big Data Marketing Needs To Get A Whole Lot Bigger  
In the old days, marketers sought to identify a target consumer and then would spend millions to catch her at the right time, in the right place, with the right message.  Success was like winning the lottery, you were never quite sure what you had until the results were in.
In the digital age, we identify a target market; bombard them with banner ads, online videos and tweets.  If we get a good response, we bombard them some more.  Has anything really changed?
The truth is that while media has been transformed, marketing practice has not kept pace.  We throw budgets into different buckets, but the decision-making process remains much the same.  You develop a theory of the case, test it in-market and then, if it goes well, do it some more.  A true digital revolution in marketing has yet to take hold, but it has begun.
Who Is The Consumer, Really?
An often-repeated lament in marketing, has been that we waste half of our advertising budget, but just don’t know which half.  It continues to resonate because we all know that increasing marketing efficiency is a great way to improve profitability.
Conceptually, the simplest way to increase efficiency is to prevent wastage. By targeting the right consumer at the right time, the right place with the right message, we can get the most out of a marketing budget.  In other words, fish where the fish are.  Put your time, effort and money where they can do the most good.
In practice, however, targeting becomes more problematic.  If 60% of your consumers are women, should you ignore men?  If 35% of your consumers are 18-24, does that really mean that you should spend all your money on college students?  A recent Catalina study found that over half of brand sales come from outside the demographic target.
We need to stop thinking about target consumers and start thinking in terms of consumer networks. Just because the daughter buys it, doesn’t mean the mother (or father or brother) won’t and beyond consumers themselves, there are advocates and detractors that can affect a purchase as well.  They all matter.
Consumer Journey Or Drunkard’s Walk?
Another popular marketing concept is the consumer journey.  (Here’s  McKinsey’s version).  In this view, prospects begin totally unaware of the wonderful brand experiences that await them until they are led on a fabulous adventure in which they consider, evaluate and purchase on a never-ending quest to becoming advocating consumers.
In reality, our behavior looks nothing like that.  I might plan on having a hamburger for lunch until my friend mentions that she’s on a diet and we opt to go for salads.  Then we hear a colleague rave about a new Tex-Mex restaurant and decide to go there until a client emergency has us hunkering down in a conference room and ordering pizza.
So our path-to-purchase looks less like a guided tour and more like a drunkard’s walk, in which we stumble around, bouncing from innate preferences to brand impressions to peer recommendations to personal experiences before we land on any particular purchase decision.
The Limits of a Statistical Approach
The use of simplistically blunt methods such as target consumers and sales funnels wasn’t so much a product of self-delusion as it was a marriage of convenience between available technology and the need for accountability. We never thought our models were a perfect depiction of reality, but developed techniques to suit the tools we had.
With a small, but controlled sample, you can extrapolate out to large populations and the error will be somewhat manageable and measurable for a limited amount of variables.  The problem is that in acomplex system, different factors interact with each other in often unpredictable and counterintuitive ways.  Micromotives often result in macrobehavior.
This issue isn’t exclusive to marketing, but occurs in many fields.  The study of epidemics, for instance, has historically used statistical models with some effect, but much was left to be desired.  More recently, they have begun to use new models with an agent-based approach, where whole populations are simulated.
One company, Concentric, is now applying similar techniques to marketing that incorporate a wide range of data sources, including qualitative and quantitative factors, in order to simulate the marketplace.  This creates a far more accurate depiction than using econometrics to optimize one KPI or another.  It also allows more flexibility.
Testing “What Ifs”
In the future, this type of agent-based modeling approach will become standard.  Instead of spending hours in conference rooms arguing the merits of targeting techniques, the “consumer mindset” or what the Marketing Director overheard his daughter and her friends say, we will come up with “what if” scenarios and test them virtually.
The models will never be perfect.  They will not account for emerging factors that we haven’t encountered before, nor will they calculate existing ones with absolute accuracy.  What they will do is help us weed out failed approaches before we spend money on them.  They will also alert us to significant market changes through post-analysis.
Most of all, an agent-based simulation approach will increase our understanding of how the marketplace works.  By continually asking “what if” and testing our notions in simulation, we can continually run experiments and learn from them, at negligible cost.
Flipping The Funnel
Amazon has taken a different approach to big data and simulations.  Instead of worrying about the consumer journey, its enormous scale and heavy IT investment make Amazon a market simulation unto itself.  The insights they gain are then deployed to offer you what you want, when you want it, through on-site optimization and email marketing.
The strategy has paid off and Amazon dominates online retail, accounting for 45% of desktop visits and almost 60% of mobile traffic.  It’s becoming more and more difficult for any company without a strong big data effort to compete in e-commerce and even those that do make the investment have a hard time matching Amazon’s data quality.
BloomReach is looking to close that gap.  It offers offers its own big data solutions to companies ranging from Drugstore.com to Nieman Marcus to Crate and Barrel.  By monitoring search engines and social media, BloomReach’s algorithms can identify consumer intent and can even create pages that match that intent with retailers’ inventory.
Much like agent-based simulation, this represents a fundamentally different approach to marketing.  Rather than trying to surmise what’s going on by extrapolating from a small sample, big data solutions allow you to track the marketplace and adapt to changes in real time.
From the “Big Idea” to the Big Simulation
Throughout its history, marketing has always been driven by visionary ideas. A big, bold concept, backed by significant media investment, could mean the difference between a hit product and a flop.  It was exciting, but risky.  No amount of research or rigor could change the fact that you were, to a large degree, taking a leap of faith.
However, in the information age, we are no longer required to believe, only to imagine, test and observe.  Instead of dreaming up big ideas and testing them in-market, we can test them in a virtual marketplace built by real-world, real-time data.  If our wild hunch falls flat, all we lose are some bits and bytes.
Concentric has put together a nice set of case studies which report a 90% model accuracy andForrester found that BloomReach delivers conversion increases of 60%.  We are, in effect, entering a new simulation economy that looks very much like the real one except that the cost of failure is negligible while the rewards of success remain massive.
And that’s the beauty of marketing driven by big data simulations, it allows us to dream bigger than ever.  We can now go and test our wildest ideas, tweak them and then turn them into realities.


How the "Pros" Make Their Living... at Your Expense


A good article on the strategies that groups use to influence individuals on how to invest. Aivars Lode Avantce

How the "Pros" Make Their Living... at Your Expense
By Porter Stansberry
Thursday, May 23, 2013
Why does anyone believe "buy and hold" works?

The mutual-fund industry, which has boomed since the 1980s, used a bunch of faulty academic research to "prove" you couldn't time the markets.
Why would they promote the idea that you can't time the markets? Because they get paid based on assets under management. They need you to leave your money with them, good times or bad. No matter what, a mutual-fund manager isn't going to return your money and tell you, "Sorry, it's just not a good time to buy stocks…" So they have to invent a world where it is always a good time to buy stocks.
You undoubtedly know their mantra: buy and hold. But it's all a lie.
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---------------------------------
Please take a moment to look carefully at this chart…
These are the daily closing prices of the Templeton Russian & East Europe mutual fund (TRF) over a 15-year period. This is one of the oldest and most established emerging-market mutual funds. This is the kind of fund people invest in heavily through 401(k) allocations.
It is a closed-end fund. It trades like a corporation – like a regular, publicly listed stock. Sometimes it trades at a premium to its net assets and sometimes at a discount. That attracts traders and speculators.

In this one investment vehicle, we have both sides of the investment world. Typical individual investors (lemmings, if you will) are dripping capital into this fund, month after month, regardless of the premium or discount and oblivious of critical factors in the marketplace.

Meanwhile, the world's best investors follow this fund closely… waiting. They are like sharks. They know this is one of the most reliably volatile funds in the world… and one of the easiest to trade successfully.

So in this one fund, you have a good litmus test to compare the two major philosophies of investing. Should you buy and hold? Should you pour capital into your 401(k) blindly each month? Or should you time the markets? Should you know the factors that lead funds like TRF to soar to absurd levels and then crash?

Looking at this chart, you easily can see the fund peaked twice in 2006 – once in the spring and again at the end of 2006/beginning of 2007. Both of these times, TRF was trading at such an extremely high premium that we noticed it immediately.

Here's exactly what we said at the time:
It is a closed-end fund. It trades like a corporation – like a regular, publicly listed stock. Sometimes it trades at a premium to its net assets and sometimes at a discount. That attracts traders and speculators.
In this one investment vehicle, we have both sides of the investment world. Typical individual investors (lemmings, if you will) are dripping capital into this fund, month after month, regardless of the premium or discount and oblivious of critical factors in the marketplace.

Meanwhile, the world's best investors follow this fund closely… waiting. They are like sharks. They know this is one of the most reliably volatile funds in the world… and one of the easiest to trade successfully.

So in this one fund, you have a good litmus test to compare the two major philosophies of investing. Should you buy and hold? Should you pour capital into your 401(k) blindly each month? Or should you time the markets? Should you know the factors that lead funds like TRF to soar to absurd levels and then crash?

Looking at this chart, you easily can see the fund peaked twice in 2006 – once in the spring and again at the end of 2006/beginning of 2007. Both of these times, TRF was trading at such an extremely high premium that we noticed it immediately.

Here's exactly what we said at the time:
In this one investment vehicle, we have both sides of the investment world. Typical individual investors (lemmings, if you will) are dripping capital into this fund, month after month, regardless of the premium or discount and oblivious of critical factors in the marketplace.
Meanwhile, the world's best investors follow this fund closely… waiting. They are like sharks. They know this is one of the most reliably volatile funds in the world… and one of the easiest to trade successfully.

So in this one fund, you have a good litmus test to compare the two major philosophies of investing. Should you buy and hold? Should you pour capital into your 401(k) blindly each month? Or should you time the markets? Should you know the factors that lead funds like TRF to soar to absurd levels and then crash?

Looking at this chart, you easily can see the fund peaked twice in 2006 – once in the spring and again at the end of 2006/beginning of 2007. Both of these times, TRF was trading at such an extremely high premium that we noticed it immediately.

Here's exactly what we said at the time:
Meanwhile, the world's best investors follow this fund closely… waiting. They are like sharks. They know this is one of the most reliably volatile funds in the world… and one of the easiest to trade successfully.
So in this one fund, you have a good litmus test to compare the two major philosophies of investing. Should you buy and hold? Should you pour capital into your 401(k) blindly each month? Or should you time the markets? Should you know the factors that lead funds like TRF to soar to absurd levels and then crash?

Looking at this chart, you easily can see the fund peaked twice in 2006 – once in the spring and again at the end of 2006/beginning of 2007. Both of these times, TRF was trading at such an extremely high premium that we noticed it immediately.

Here's exactly what we said at the time:
So in this one fund, you have a good litmus test to compare the two major philosophies of investing. Should you buy and hold? Should you pour capital into your 401(k) blindly each month? Or should you time the markets? Should you know the factors that lead funds like TRF to soar to absurd levels and then crash?
Looking at this chart, you easily can see the fund peaked twice in 2006 – once in the spring and again at the end of 2006/beginning of 2007. Both of these times, TRF was trading at such an extremely high premium that we noticed it immediately.

Here's exactly what we said at the time:
Looking at this chart, you easily can see the fund peaked twice in 2006 – once in the spring and again at the end of 2006/beginning of 2007. Both of these times, TRF was trading at such an extremely high premium that we noticed it immediately.
Here's exactly what we said at the time:
Here's exactly what we said at the time:
With emerging market speculation heating up again, TRF is trading for a 24% premium right now. If that premium climbs any higher, we predict another obliteration. – Brian Hunt, DailyWealth, December 21, 2006
We published that note in December 2006. By March 2009, it had lost more than 90% of its value.
Perhaps more importantly to any long-term, buy-and-hold investor, the decline we foresaw in the fund would have wiped out more than 100% of the accumulated capital gains, assuming you invested as much as 15 years earlier.

Now… I'd like you to look at the chart one more time. Look at what happened to the fund in the first half of 2009. It went nearly straight up.

On April 17, 2009, we told subscribers to buy Russian stocks. Instead of using TRF, Steve Sjuggerud recommended a nearly identical Scudder Fund, the Central Europe and Russia Fund (CEE). Both went up 150% from their March lows.

So if you followed the buy-and-hold strategy in Russian stocks over the last 15 years, you would have made a very small amount of money – or lost money, depending on when you sold your shares. On the other hand, if you applied a few of our secrets, you could have easily traded this fund for more than 100% gains in only a few weeks. And if you watch this fund, you'll be able to make trades like this three or four times each decade. If you watch other similar funds, you'll be able to make trades like this once or twice a year.

And let me tell you one more thing about this situation. In January 2007, when TRF was widely overvalued and when most individual investors were clamoring to buy shares – despite the premium valuation – we checked to see if we could sell the fund short. We knew it was going to collapse and wanted to profit directly as it fell. But we couldn't. Why not? Because other professionals had a
lready borrowed all of the available shares to short.

In other words, while 401(k) investors were buying and holding a time bomb, Wall Street's pros were lined up, waiting to take their money.

That's why we call "buy and hold" "buy and fold." That's what happens. People think they're investors when they buy. But sooner or later, the pain gets so bad and the loss is so big they panic and sell. Wall Street wins.

Would you have been able to continue buying the Templeton Russia Fund through the collapse of 2008? Not many people could. Instead, they chase hot sectors and investment fads and buy in at the worst possible time. Then after prices collapse, sooner or later, the pain and fear become unbearable, and they liquidate their investments – usually at the exact bottom.

Believe me, the pros know that's what individual investors are going to do. That's how they make their living.

Meanwhile, the big mutual-fund companies spend millions on "buy and hold" advertising each year. They give more millions to academic researchers – all of whom "prove" you can't time the market.

According to these folks, we shouldn't have been able to do the kind of trading we did with the Templeton Russia & East Europe Fund. They would tell you we didn't have any real edge against the other investors in the fund. They would tell you we just got "lucky" – despite the fact that we do these kinds of trades year after year.

And when researchers study actual mutual-fund returns, the results are nothing like the averages you find in the prospectus. Most people who invest in mutual funds never make more than 5% a year on average because they buy the wrong funds at the wrong times and sell at exactly the wrong times. And anyone who was buying stock mutual funds over the last 15 years most likely lost money overall.

Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

Perhaps more importantly to any long-term, buy-and-hold investor, the decline we foresaw in the fund would have wiped out more than 100% of the accumulated capital gains, assuming you invested as much as 15 years earlier.
Now… I'd like you to look at the chart one more time. Look at what happened to the fund in the first half of 2009. It went nearly straight up.

On April 17, 2009, we told subscribers to buy Russian stocks. Instead of using TRF, Steve Sjuggerud recommended a nearly identical Scudder Fund, the Central Europe and Russia Fund (CEE). Both went up 150% from their March lows.

So if you followed the buy-and-hold strategy in Russian stocks over the last 15 years, you would have made a very small amount of money – or lost money, depending on when you sold your shares. On the other hand, if you applied a few of our secrets, you could have easily traded this fund for more than 100% gains in only a few weeks. And if you watch this fund, you'll be able to make trades like this three or four times each decade. If you watch other similar funds, you'll be able to make trades like this once or twice a year.

And let me tell you one more thing about this situation. In January 2007, when TRF was widely overvalued and when most individual investors were clamoring to buy shares – despite the premium valuation – we checked to see if we could sell the fund short. We knew it was going to collapse and wanted to profit directly as it fell. But we couldn't. Why not? Because other professionals had already borrowed all of the available shares to short.

In other words, while 401(k) investors were buying and holding a time bomb, Wall Street's pros were lined up, waiting to take their money.

That's why we call "buy and hold" "buy and fold." That's what happens. People think they're investors when they buy. But sooner or later, the pain gets so bad and the loss is so big they panic and sell. Wall Street wins.

Would you have been able to continue buying the Templeton Russia Fund through the collapse of 2008? Not many people could. Instead, they chase hot sectors and investment fads and buy in at the worst possible time. Then after prices collapse, sooner or later, the pain and fear become unbearable, and they liquidate their investments – usually at the exact bottom.

Believe me, the pros know that's what individual investors are going to do. That's how they make their living.

Meanwhile, the big mutual-fund companies spend millions on "buy and hold" advertising each year. They give more millions to academic researchers – all of whom "prove" you can't time the market.

According to these folks, we shouldn't have been able to do the kind of trading we did with the Templeton Russia & East Europe Fund. They would tell you we didn't have any real edge against the other investors in the fund. They would tell you we just got "lucky" – despite the fact that we do these kinds of trades year after year.

And when researchers study actual mutual-fund returns, the results are nothing like the averages you find in the prospectus. Most people who invest in mutual funds never make more than 5% a year on average because they buy the wrong funds at the wrong times and sell at exactly the wrong times. And anyone who was buying stock mutual funds over the last 15 years most likely lost money overall.

Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

Now… I'd like you to look at the chart one more time. Look at what happened to the fund in the first half of 2009. It went nearly straight up.
On April 17, 2009, we told subscribers to buy Russian stocks. Instead of using TRF, Steve Sjuggerud recommended a nearly identical Scudder Fund, the Central Europe and Russia Fund (CEE). Both went up 150% from their March lows.

So if you followed the buy-and-hold strategy in Russian stocks over the last 15 years, you would have made a very small amount of money – or lost money, depending on when you sold your shares. On the other hand, if you applied a few of our secrets, you could have easily traded this fund for more than 100% gains in only a few weeks. And if you watch this fund, you'll be able to make trades like this three or four times each decade. If you watch other similar funds, you'll be able to make trades like this once or twice a year.

And let me tell you one more thing about this situation. In January 2007, when TRF was widely overvalued and when most individual investors were clamoring to buy shares – despite the premium valuation – we checked to see if we could sell the fund short. We knew it was going to collapse and wanted to profit directly as it fell. But we couldn't. Why not? Because other professionals had already borrowed all of the available shares to short.

In other words, while 401(k) investors were buying and holding a time bomb, Wall Street's pros were lined up, waiting to take their money.

That's why we call "buy and hold" "buy and fold." That's what happens. People think they're investors when they buy. But sooner or later, the pain gets so bad and the loss is so big they panic and sell. Wall Street wins.

Would you have been able to continue buying the Templeton Russia Fund through the collapse of 2008? Not many people could. Instead, they chase hot sectors and investment fads and buy in at the worst possible time. Then after prices collapse, sooner or later, the pain and fear become unbearable, and they liquidate their investments – usually at the exact bottom.

Believe me, the pros know that's what individual investors are going to do. That's how they make their living.

Meanwhile, the big mutual-fund companies spend millions on "buy and hold" advertising each year. They give more millions to academic researchers – all of whom "prove" you can't time the market.

According to these folks, we shouldn't have been able to do the kind of trading we did with the Templeton Russia & East Europe Fund. They would tell you we didn't have any real edge against the other investors in the fund. They would tell you we just got "lucky" – despite the fact that we do these kinds of trades year after year.

And when researchers study actual mutual-fund returns, the results are nothing like the averages you find in the prospectus. Most people who invest in mutual funds never make more than 5% a year on average because they buy the wrong funds at the wrong times and sell at exactly the wrong times. And anyone who was buying stock mutual funds over the last 15 years most likely lost money overall.

Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

On April 17, 2009, we told subscribers to buy Russian stocks. Instead of using TRF, Steve Sjuggerud recommended a nearly identical Scudder Fund, the Central Europe and Russia Fund (CEE). Both went up 150% from their March lows.
So if you followed the buy-and-hold strategy in Russian stocks over the last 15 years, you would have made a very small amount of money – or lost money, depending on when you sold your shares. On the other hand, if you applied a few of our secrets, you could have easily traded this fund for more than 100% gains in only a few weeks. And if you watch this fund, you'll be able to make trades like this three or four times each decade. If you watch other similar funds, you'll be able to make trades like this once or twice a year.

And let me tell you one more thing about this situation. In January 2007, when TRF was widely overvalued and when most individual investors were clamoring to buy shares – despite the premium valuation – we checked to see if we could sell the fund short. We knew it was going to collapse and wanted to profit directly as it fell. But we couldn't. Why not? Because other professionals had already borrowed all of the available shares to short.

In other words, while 401(k) investors were buying and holding a time bomb, Wall Street's pros were lined up, waiting to take their money.

That's why we call "buy and hold" "buy and fold." That's what happens. People think they're investors when they buy. But sooner or later, the pain gets so bad and the loss is so big they panic and sell. Wall Street wins.

Would you have been able to continue buying the Templeton Russia Fund through the collapse of 2008? Not many people could. Instead, they chase hot sectors and investment fads and buy in at the worst possible time. Then after prices collapse, sooner or later, the pain and fear become unbearable, and they liquidate their investments – usually at the exact bottom.

Believe me, the pros know that's what individual investors are going to do. That's how they make their living.

Meanwhile, the big mutual-fund companies spend millions on "buy and hold" advertising each year. They give more millions to academic researchers – all of whom "prove" you can't time the market.

According to these folks, we shouldn't have been able to do the kind of trading we did with the Templeton Russia & East Europe Fund. They would tell you we didn't have any real edge against the other investors in the fund. They would tell you we just got "lucky" – despite the fact that we do these kinds of trades year after year.

And when researchers study actual mutual-fund returns, the results are nothing like the averages you find in the prospectus. Most people who invest in mutual funds never make more than 5% a year on average because they buy the wrong funds at the wrong times and sell at exactly the wrong times. And anyone who was buying stock mutual funds over the last 15 years most likely lost money overall.

Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

So if you followed the buy-and-hold strategy in Russian stocks over the last 15 years, you would have made a very small amount of money – or lost money, depending on when you sold your shares. On the other hand, if you applied a few of our secrets, you could have easily traded this fund for more than 100% gains in only a few weeks. And if you watch this fund, you'll be able to make trades like this three or four times each decade. If you watch other similar funds, you'll be able to make trades like this once or twice a year.
And let me tell you one more thing about this situation. In January 2007, when TRF was widely overvalued and when most individual investors were clamoring to buy shares – despite the premium valuation – we checked to see if we could sell the fund short. We knew it was going to collapse and wanted to profit directly as it fell. But we couldn't. Why not? Because other professionals had already borrowed all of the available shares to short.

In other words, while 401(k) investors were buying and holding a time bomb, Wall Street's pros were lined up, waiting to take their money.

That's why we call "buy and hold" "buy and fold." That's what happens. People think they're investors when they buy. But sooner or later, the pain gets so bad and the loss is so big they panic and sell. Wall Street wins.

Would you have been able to continue buying the Templeton Russia Fund through the collapse of 2008? Not many people could. Instead, they chase hot sectors and investment fads and buy in at the worst possible time. Then after prices collapse, sooner or later, the pain and fear become unbearable, and they liquidate their investments – usually at the exact bottom.

Believe me, the pros know that's what individual investors are going to do. That's how they make their living.

Meanwhile, the big mutual-fund companies spend millions on "buy and hold" advertising each year. They give more millions to academic researchers – all of whom "prove" you can't time the market.

According to these folks, we shouldn't have been able to do the kind of trading we did with the Templeton Russia & East Europe Fund. They would tell you we didn't have any real edge against the other investors in the fund. They would tell you we just got "lucky" – despite the fact that we do these kinds of trades year after year.

And when researchers study actual mutual-fund returns, the results are nothing like the averages you find in the prospectus. Most people who invest in mutual funds never make more than 5% a year on average because they buy the wrong funds at the wrong times and sell at exactly the wrong times. And anyone who was buying stock mutual funds over the last 15 years most likely lost money overall.

Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

And let me tell you one more thing about this situation. In January 2007, when TRF was widely overvalued and when most individual investors were clamoring to buy shares – despite the premium valuation – we checked to see if we could sell the fund short. We knew it was going to collapse and wanted to profit directly as it fell. But we couldn't. Why not? Because other professionals had already borrowed all of the available shares to short.
In other words, while 401(k) investors were buying and holding a time bomb, Wall Street's pros were lined up, waiting to take their money.

That's why we call "buy and hold" "buy and fold." That's what happens. People think they're investors when they buy. But sooner or later, the pain gets so bad and the loss is so big they panic and sell. Wall Street wins.

Would you have been able to continue buying the Templeton Russia Fund through the collapse of 2008? Not many people could. Instead, they chase hot sectors and investment fads and buy in at the worst possible time. Then after prices collapse, sooner or later, the pain and fear become unbearable, and they liquidate their investments – usually at the exact bottom.

Believe me, the pros know that's what individual investors are going to do. That's how they make their living.

Meanwhile, the big mutual-fund companies spend millions on "buy and hold" advertising each year. They give more millions to academic researchers – all of whom "prove" you can't time the market.

According to these folks, we shouldn't have been able to do the kind of trading we did with the Templeton Russia & East Europe Fund. They would tell you we didn't have any real edge against the other investors in the fund. They would tell you we just got "lucky" – despite the fact that we do these kinds of trades year after year.

And when researchers study actual mutual-fund returns, the results are nothing like the averages you find in the prospectus. Most people who invest in mutual funds never make more than 5% a year on average because they buy the wrong funds at the wrong times and sell at exactly the wrong times. And anyone who was buying stock mutual funds over the last 15 years most likely lost money overall.

Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

In other words, while 401(k) investors were buying and holding a time bomb, Wall Street's pros were lined up, waiting to take their money.
That's why we call "buy and hold" "buy and fold." That's what happens. People think they're investors when they buy. But sooner or later, the pain gets so bad and the loss is so big they panic and sell. Wall Street wins.

Would you have been able to continue buying the Templeton Russia Fund through the collapse of 2008? Not many people could. Instead, they chase hot sectors and investment fads and buy in at the worst possible time. Then after prices collapse, sooner or later, the pain and fear become unbearable, and they liquidate their investments – usually at the exact bottom.

Believe me, the pros know that's what individual investors are going to do. That's how they make their living.

Meanwhile, the big mutual-fund companies spend millions on "buy and hold" advertising each year. They give more millions to academic researchers – all of whom "prove" you can't time the market.

According to these folks, we shouldn't have been able to do the kind of trading we did with the Templeton Russia & East Europe Fund. They would tell you we didn't have any real edge against the other investors in the fund. They would tell you we just got "lucky" – despite the fact that we do these kinds of trades year after year.

And when researchers study actual mutual-fund returns, the results are nothing like the averages you find in the prospectus. Most people who invest in mutual funds never make more than 5% a year on average because they buy the wrong funds at the wrong times and sell at exactly the wrong times. And anyone who was buying stock mutual funds over the last 15 years most likely lost money overall.

Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

That's why we call "buy and hold" "buy and fold." That's what happens. People think they're investors when they buy. But sooner or later, the pain gets so bad and the loss is so big they panic and sell. Wall Street wins.
Would you have been able to continue buying the Templeton Russia Fund through the collapse of 2008? Not many people could. Instead, they chase hot sectors and investment fads and buy in at the worst possible time. Then after prices collapse, sooner or later, the pain and fear become unbearable, and they liquidate their investments – usually at the exact bottom.

Believe me, the pros know that's what individual investors are going to do. That's how they make their living.

Meanwhile, the big mutual-fund companies spend millions on "buy and hold" advertising each year. They give more millions to academic researchers – all of whom "prove" you can't time the market.

According to these folks, we shouldn't have been able to do the kind of trading we did with the Templeton Russia & East Europe Fund. They would tell you we didn't have any real edge against the other investors in the fund. They would tell you we just got "lucky" – despite the fact that we do these kinds of trades year after year.

And when researchers study actual mutual-fund returns, the results are nothing like the averages you find in the prospectus. Most people who invest in mutual funds never make more than 5% a year on average because they buy the wrong funds at the wrong times and sell at exactly the wrong times. And anyone who was buying stock mutual funds over the last 15 years most likely lost money overall.

Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

Would you have been able to continue buying the Templeton Russia Fund through the collapse of 2008? Not many people could. Instead, they chase hot sectors and investment fads and buy in at the worst possible time. Then after prices collapse, sooner or later, the pain and fear become unbearable, and they liquidate their investments – usually at the exact bottom.
Believe me, the pros know that's what individual investors are going to do. That's how they make their living.

Meanwhile, the big mutual-fund companies spend millions on "buy and hold" advertising each year. They give more millions to academic researchers – all of whom "prove" you can't time the market.

According to these folks, we shouldn't have been able to do the kind of trading we did with the Templeton Russia & East Europe Fund. They would tell you we didn't have any real edge against the other investors in the fund. They would tell you we just got "lucky" – despite the fact that we do these kinds of trades year after year.

And when researchers study actual mutual-fund returns, the results are nothing like the averages you find in the prospectus. Most people who invest in mutual funds never make more than 5% a year on average because they buy the wrong funds at the wrong times and sell at exactly the wrong times. And anyone who was buying stock mutual funds over the last 15 years most likely lost money overall.

Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

Believe me, the pros know that's what individual investors are going to do. That's how they make their living.
Meanwhile, the big mutual-fund companies spend millions on "buy and hold" advertising each year. They give more millions to academic researchers – all of whom "prove" you can't time the market.

According to these folks, we shouldn't have been able to do the kind of trading we did with the Templeton Russia & East Europe Fund. They would tell you we didn't have any real edge against the other investors in the fund. They would tell you we just got "lucky" – despite the fact that we do these kinds of trades year after year.

And when researchers study actual mutual-fund returns, the results are nothing like the averages you find in the prospectus. Most people who invest in mutual funds never make more than 5% a year on average because they buy the wrong funds at the wrong times and sell at exactly the wrong times. And anyone who was buying stock mutual funds over the last 15 years most likely lost money overall.

Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

Meanwhile, the big mutual-fund companies spend millions on "buy and hold" advertising each year. They give more millions to academic researchers – all of whom "prove" you can't time the market.
According to these folks, we shouldn't have been able to do the kind of trading we did with the Templeton Russia & East Europe Fund. They would tell you we didn't have any real edge against the other investors in the fund. They would tell you we just got "lucky" – despite the fact that we do these kinds of trades year after year.

And when researchers study actual mutual-fund returns, the results are nothing like the averages you find in the prospectus. Most people who invest in mutual funds never make more than 5% a year on average because they buy the wrong funds at the wrong times and sell at exactly the wrong times. And anyone who was buying stock mutual funds over the last 15 years most likely lost money overall.

Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

According to these folks, we shouldn't have been able to do the kind of trading we did with the Templeton Russia & East Europe Fund. They would tell you we didn't have any real edge against the other investors in the fund. They would tell you we just got "lucky" – despite the fact that we do these kinds of trades year after year.
And when researchers study actual mutual-fund returns, the results are nothing like the averages you find in the prospectus. Most people who invest in mutual funds never make more than 5% a year on average because they buy the wrong funds at the wrong times and sell at exactly the wrong times. And anyone who was buying stock mutual funds over the last 15 years most likely lost money overall.

Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

And when researchers study actual mutual-fund returns, the results are nothing like the averages you find in the prospectus. Most people who invest in mutual funds never make more than 5% a year on average because they buy the wrong funds at the wrong times and sell at exactly the wrong times. And anyone who was buying stock mutual funds over the last 15 years most likely lost money overall.
Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

Buy and hold doesn't work for two reasons: It ignores valuation and sentiment and it ignores human nature.
Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

Even if buy and hold did work, it would be a less-than-optimal strategy because, as should be readily apparent to everyone who watches the stock market, the market isn't as "efficient" as so many academics claim.
The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

The intellectual rationale for buy and hold is the idea that securities prices instantly reflect all the information available. You can't get an advantage on the market. The best investors can hope to do, therefore, is to get the market's average return. And the only sure way to do this is to buy an index fund, year after year, and hold it forever.
This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

This idea – that information is reflected accurately and instantly in the market – is preposterous. In the first place, lots of people trading stocks don't know what they're doing. They can't accurately handicap stock prices because they don't know the first thing about valuation.
But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

But even more than this, most of what's important to stock prices is unknowable. Nobody knows what the future holds for things like interest rates and economic growth. People's emotions about these unknowable variables – what we call "sentiment" – make a far bigger impact on stock prices than the latest earnings report. And people's emotions are anything but rational or efficient.
You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

You can dramatically increase your returns in common stocks if you're simply more disciplined about when you make major investments. You only want to commit a substantial amount of capital when both valuation and sentiment are in extremely bullish ranges. In short, you want to buy when stocks are cheap and most people are afraid to buy them.
Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.

Regards,

Porter Stansberry

Unfortunately, these opportunities don't arise often in U.S. blue-chip stocks. But you can almost always find these conditions somewhere or in some part of the U.S. market.
Regards,

Porter Stansberry

Regards,
Porter Stansberry

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The Templeton Russia Fund (TRF) is about to get crushed again. Stuffed with Russian oil and bank stocks, this ETF is one of the few direct Russia plays in the market… This spring, the premium on TRF hit a whopping 35%. You had to pay $1.35 for every $1 of real value. This huge overvaluation was corrected when emerging markets got obliterated in May. The Russia Fund fared the worst, falling 47% from its peak.


A Legacy Feud in Tech

A great article on where the future of computing is going. We are seeing a similar shift as we did when there was a shift from eth mainframe to Client server and oracle and SAP grew. The business practices of the Oracles of the world will drive customers to look for new more cost efficient solutions. Aivars Lode Avantce

A Legacy Feud in Tech

James Best Jr. / The New York Times
By QUENTIN HARDY
May 26, 2013
SAN FRANCISCO — If the Hatfields and McCoys lived in Silicon Valley, they’d be fighting with piles of cash and lines of software code instead of knives and shotguns. And the fight would be over who wins the most customers in the computer industry’s growing “cloud” of software services.
That’s how it is for Aneel Bhusri and Zachary Nelson, whose companies are in contention over the next major shift in computing. In a way, the men are reliving history.
Two decades ago, their mentors feuded, and that time, too, the dispute took place against the backdrop of a major shift in corporate computing — when customers gave up their mainframes and moved to software that relied on personal computers closely connected to a server.
Mr. Nelson, the chief executive of NetSuite, used to work for Lawrence J. Ellison, the billionaire chief executive of Oracle.

Mr. Bhusri, the co-founder of a competitor company called Workday, used to work for David Duffield, a rival of Mr. Ellison’s. Mr. Duffield is the low-profile founder of PeopleSoft, a once-powerful maker of corporate software that Oracle acquired in a bitter, 17-month hostile takeover fight.
How bitter? Oracle defeated a federal antitrust lawsuit brought by the Justice Department before it could reel in its rival. And a month after PeopleSoft was acquired, 5,000 of its 11,000 employees were laid off.
Together, NetSuite and Workday are among a growing circle of tech outfits poised to cash in on the migration to cloud computing services and perhaps elbow aside today’s corporate software giants, like Oracle and the German company SAP.
“It would be a mistake to see this as a revenge play, though other people might see it that way,” Mr. Bhusri (pronounced “Bush-ree”) said in an interview, referring to his company’s efforts to take on Oracle’s business. “PeopleSoft came in second or third. This time we can be first.”


Workday and NetSuite each have annual sales of less than $400 million, about 1 percent of what Oracle sells in software, but the stock of both companies has rocketed on expectations that they are in the heart of a market that could grow five times faster than the rest of the tech industry, according to IDC, the technology research firm.
Companies in this growing area could be acquisition targets. IDC predicts that by mid-2014 the big software makers will have spent as much as $25 billion on acquisitions as they build out their cloud services.
While the market value of Oracle and SAP both reflect about four times their annual sales, NetSuite shares trades at 20 times its sales, and Workday is valued at 40 times. Last Wednesday, Workday reported revenue for its first fiscal quarter of $91.6 million, up 61 percent from a year earlier. In its most recent quarter, which ended March 31, NetSuite also had $91.6 million in revenue, up 32 percent from the same period a year ago.
The two upstarts both deliver services — NetSuite in accounting and Workday in human resources — that perform essential business functions, and from there have broadened into other areas.


Their services perform the same functions as traditional business software to manage tasks like accounting and tracking employee benefits. But instead of selling a license to own that software, which requires the customer to install it on a server, the two companies provide access to their services over the Internet and customers pay on a subscription basis.
Mr. Bhusri, 47, and Mr. Duffield started Workday in 2005. Mr. Bhusri is chairman, and the men share the chief executive role. Mr. Bhusri, a partner at the venture capital firm Greylock Partners, is on the board of several other cloud companies.
“They are all companies in the Dave Duffield model — the good guy model, as opposed to the other guy,” Mr. Bhusri said. An open, self-effacing man, he declined to identify the “other guy,” but added, “I would be amazed if Oracle does not buy NetSuite.”
Mr. Duffield hired Mr. Bhusri at PeopleSoft. Based in Pleasanton, Calif., about 30 miles from Oracle, it was sometimes called the “People company” and was known for its casual atmosphere.

Mr. Duffield often signed e-mails with his initials, D.A.D., and the company regularly held beer parties, where the entertainment was the house band, the Ravin’ Daves. (Mr. Duffield did not play in the band.) And at those parties, Mr. Duffield was known to lead his employees in anti-Oracle cheers.
“He is my best friend,” Mr. Bhusri said of Mr. Duffield.
Mr. Bhusri rose fast at PeopleSoft, but he became caught up in a difficult effort to move PeopleSoft products online. When Mr. Duffield retired in 1999, Mr. Bhusri was not given the top job because he was thought to have too little experience in operations and sales. Mr. Bhusri went to Greylock, but continued to serve as vice chairman of PeopleSoft.
This was about the time that Mr. Ellison co-founded NetSuite with a former Oracle programmer, offering software services for tasks like financial and customer management.
Mr. Nelson, the NetSuite chief, scoffs at the idea that Oracle will acquire his company, based in San Mateo, Calif., a few miles from Oracle’s campus. Instead, he says, NetSuite will become a critical company, not just for accounting, but for retailing and manufacturing globally.
He got the attention of Mr. Ellison in 1996, when as the head of marketing at Oracle he wrote an ad mocking the processing speed of competitors’ products. “It read ‘Gentlemen, start your snails,’ “ recalled Mr. Nelson, a Stanford graduate whose artifact-rich office shows an abiding interest in anthropology. He joined NetSuite in 2002 as chief operating officer, and took over as C.E.O. by the end of the year. “I was in with him forever,” he said.
Troubles between PeopleSoft and Oracle began in June 2003, when Mr. Ellison announced an unsolicited offer to acquire PeopleSoft for $5.1 billion. Within a month, it raised its offer, and touched off a lawsuit by PeopleSoft that accused Oracle of interfering with its business.
The Justice Department began an antitrust investigation. In the ensuing months, Oracle raised its offer to buy PeopleSoft, and then reduced it after PeopleSoft reported lower earnings. At one point, PeopleSoft’s chief executive, Craig Conway, who had worked at Oracle, referred to Oracle as a “sociopathic” company.
Oracle defeated the Justice Department’s investigation in September 2004, the same month Mr. Conway was removed and Mr. Duffield returned as chief. The two hoped to fight Oracle’s takeover with a poison-pill defense, but on the eve of a trial challenging that tactic, PeopleSoft’s board accepted Oracle’s offer of $10.3 billion.
Mr. Duffield, 72, says losing PeopleSoft is still painful. “It was 17 years of my life,” he said. Following his return to the company, he said, “I expected to be there this very day, with Aneel.”
“I don’t dislike” Mr. Ellison, Mr. Duffield said, “he made very good business decisions.” He also noted that if Oracle hadn’t gone after PeopleSoft, and prevailed against him, “I’d still be retired. Amazingly, we got a new chance.” Mr. Ellison, who is 68 and is also pushing Oracle into online software, declined to be interviewed.
Workday’s service, based on technology created by a former PeopleSoft employee that Mr. Duffield and Mr. Bhusri acquired for about $1.5 million, operates without one Oracle database.
That is a rarity among cloud computing companies, and it is a decision that Mr. Nelson of NetSuite thinks will end up hurting the company. “They have to build all this stuff that I don’t have to,” he said. As for SAP, Mr. Nelson added, “Larry has them on such a tilt that they don’t know how to think about things.”
SAP takes an equally dim view of its small rival. “SAP is a major player in the cloud today, with over 29 million cloud users,” James Dever, an SAP spokesman, said in an e-mail. “As for the attacks on SAP, they would be more convincing if it weren’t so easy to see the hand of Larry Ellison working the Zach Nelson puppet.”
This large if unglamorous part of the tech industry — revolving around accounting and human resources software, not shiny smartphones — may be an unlikely rumbling turf. But along with manufacturing, their services are at the heart of the work structure for most companies, making it a very big business.
Oracle and SAP have a combined market value of $258 billion, and according to Bloomberg’s Billionaires Index, Mr. Ellison is personally worth $41 billion, making him the world’s eighth richest man. Mr. Duffield, who is also a billionaire thanks in part to Oracle’s costly takeover of PeopleSoft, acknowledges that Workday now has less than 1 percent of Oracle’s revenue, but said “that’s 99 percent to go.”
But today’s competition isn’t about the money. “They all have that,” said Peter Goldmacher, a managing director of Cowen and Company in San Francisco. “It’s about who owns the future.”